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Abstract
We propose a uniform approach for the design and analysis of prior-free competitive auctions
and online auctions. Our philosophy is to view the benchmark function as a variable parameter
of the model and study a broad class of functions instead of a individual target benchmark. We
consider a multitude of well-studied auction settings, and improve upon a few previous results.
• Multi-unit auctions. Given a β-competitive unlimited supply auction, the best previously
known multi-unit auction is 2β-competitive. We design a (1 + β)-competitive auction
reducing the ratio from 4.84 to 3.24. These results carry over to matroid and position
auctions.
• General downward-closed environments. We design a 6.5-competitive auction improving
upon the ratio of 7.5. Our auction is noticeably simpler than the previous best one.
• Unlimited supply online auctions. Our analysis yields an auction with a competitive
ratio of 4.12, which significantly narrows the margin of [4, 4.84] previously known for this
problem.
A particularly important tool in our analysis is a simple decomposition lemma, which allows
us to bound the competitive ratio against a sum of benchmark functions. We use this lemma
in a “divide and conquer” fashion by dividing the target benchmark into the sum of simpler
functions.
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1 Introduction
A common theme in the design and analysis of online algorithms and prior-free auctions is the
competitive framework. In both cases, an online algorithm, which has to make irrevocable deci-
sions online, or a truthful mechanism, whose outcomes must be aligned with bidders’ incentives,
are competing against a benchmark corresponding to a desirable outcome. In each specific problem
there usually is a unique well-motivated benchmark (rarely a few) with a small gap to its hand-
icapped competitors. In this sense, a benchmark is treated as an alternative mechanism or an
algorithm that does not need to take into account incentives, or the online nature of a problem. On
the other hand, a benchmark is just a mapping form the space of all possible inputs to real values
representing the desired level of efficiency. From this point of view, one may fix any reasonable
function as a benchmark and see how well a design can fit it. We may even ask this question for a
class of benchmark functions.
This approach may seem more demanding, however can be helpful in the original problem. In
particular, some classes of benchmark functions naturally admit well suited designs. Even if these
functions are not close enough to the benchmark of interest, we still may use them as building
blocks. In particular, we might be able to decompose the original inconvenient benchmark into the
sum of simpler ones, each with a good performance guarantee. On the other note, it is often the
case that an online or auction problem admits a reduction to a simpler one. It can be only easier
to streamline the problem if we have a better understanding of the simpler setting for a variety
of benchmarks. In this paper we demonstrate how these ideas apply to a multitude of auction
problems including certain online instances.
We will be looking at single-parameter environments, where an auctioneer sells an abstract
service to n potential customers bidding in the auction. The auctioneer has a feasibility constraint
on which sets of agents can be served simultaneously. Each bidder i values the service at a single
privately known value vi. We consider a single-round auction, where each bidder submits a sealed
bid bi. After soliciting the bids auctioneer decides on whether each bidder i receives the service
and the amount that i pays. If bidder i gets served, his utility is the difference between his value vi
and his payment; otherwise, the bidder pays 0 and his utility is 0. The auctioneer’s revenue is the
total payment of the bidders. We consider the following well-studied single-parameter settings.
• Digital goods. The auctioneer sells unlimited number of copies of a single item (e.g., digital
goods). Thus, any set of winners is feasible.
• Limited supply (a.k.a. multi-unit) auctions. There are ℓ copies of the item in total, and thus,
at most ℓ bidders can be served. There is a ratio-preserving reduction [20] to limited supply
auctions from position and matroid environments, which have applications in FCC spectrum
auction and sponsored search. All our results for multi-unit environment carry over to these
settings.
• General downward-closed permutation environments. Set system of feasible sets is downward-
closed if any subset of a feasible set is also feasible. The auctioneer has a probabilistic
feasibility constraint, i.e., given by a probability distribution over feasible sets. Bidders are
assumed to be symmetric, i.e., bidders’ values are revealed in a random order. This is a
generalization of multi-unit and position auctions, as well as matching environments, where
each feasible set represents vertices on the one side of a bipartite matching.
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• Online auctions. The bidders arrive online one by one and the auctioneer makes an irrevocable
decision (whether the bidder receives a service or not and at what price) immediately as each
new bidder arrives. Online auctions capture important scenarios happening continuously in
the Internet, where bidders may appear at any time and want to receive service right away.
The scope of our work is prior-free auction design as opposed to the more traditional in eco-
nomics, Bayesian framework, where buyers’ preferences are assumed to come from a given distribu-
tion and performance is measured in expectation over the prior distribution. In prior-free settings
we look for auctions that perform well (with respect to a benchmark) without any prior knowledge
of the bidders’ preferences. These auctions are robust to changes of the prior distribution and often
give a good approximation to the auctions that are specifically tailored to a distribution.
1.1 Benchmarks and Competitive Analysis
We assume that all bidders are selfish and aim to maximize their own utility. We say that an
auction is truthful or incentive compatible if it is a dominant strategy for every bidder i to bid
his private value, i.e., bi = vi, no matter how other bidders behave. A randomized auction is
(universally) truthful if it is given by a distribution over deterministic truthful auctions.
The objective is to design auctions that maximize revenue of the auctioneer. To evaluate the
performance of an auction, we need to define a benchmark function f : Rn → R, where f(b)
measures our target revenue for the bid vector b ∈ Rn. Given a benchmark function f(·), we say
that an auction A has a competitive ratio of λ with respect to f(·) if
E [A(b)] ≥
f(b)
λ
, ∀b = (b1, . . . , bn) ∈ R
n
where E[A(b)] is the expected revenue of auction A on the bid vector b.
A benchmark function should be, on the one hand, economically meaningful in providing a
revenue target, and on the other hand not too ambitious so that a truthful auction may have small
competitive ratio against the benchmark. For the auction with unlimited supply, the most well-
studied benchmark is F (2)(b) = max2≤k≤n k · b(k), where bids are reordered so that b(1) ≥ b(2) ≥
· · · ≥ b(n). That is, F
(2) gives the largest possible revenue of a fixed price sale given that there are at
least two buyers. The reason for having at least two winners is that otherwise, all but one bidders
may have 0 value and then no truthful auction can be competitive against a single bidder with
arbitrary large private value. Another meaningful benchmark is maxV(b) = max1≤k<n k · b(k+1).
We note that k · b(k+1) is the revenue of the Vickrey auction selling k units. Hence, maxV is the
maximum revenue of a k-unit Vickrey auction for all possible values of the supply k.
For the ℓ-unit auctions, one can naturally extend the definition of F (2) to
F (2,ℓ)(b) = max
2≤k≤ℓ
k · b(k).
This is the largest possible revenue of a fixed price sale given that there are at least two and at
most ℓ buyers (as there are only ℓ copies).
Hartline and Yan [20] gave another interpretation of F (2) for the unlimited supply setting.
Namely, it is the optimal revenue one can extract in an envy-free allocation with at least two
winners. The definition was extended by [20] to more general environments such as limited supply
and general downward-closed environments. We denote by EFO(2) the largest revenue that can
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be obtained in an envy-free allocation for a slightly modified bid vector b2 = (b2, b2, . . . , bn).
Interestingly, although EFO(2) coincides with F (2) in the digital goods setting, EFO(2) is not the
same as F (2,ℓ) for the limited supply case, where the precise formula for EFO(2) will be given in
Section 2.
For the online setting, we focus on the model of Koutsoupias and Pierrakos [23] of unlimited
supply auctions competing against the benchmark F (2) and maxV. We assume random arrival
order of the bidders, as if bidders arrive in an adversarial order, competitive ratio cannot be a
constant [23].
1.2 Results and Techniques
Our recent work [7] on digital goods auction proposed a uniform procedure for calculating the opti-
mal competitive ratio against any monotone benchmark. In particular, it yielded tight competitive
ratios against the maxV and F (2) benchmarks. Here, we study the design of competitive auctions
in other settings. We summarize previous and our new results in the following table. (Since some of
the earlier work used auctions for digital goods as a black-box, we update their bounds accordingly
with the new tight bounds of [7].)
Limited supply Downward-closed Online Online
EFO(2) EFO(2) F (2) maxV
Previous upper bounds 4.84 [20] 7.5 [9] 4.84 [23] -
Our upper bounds 3.24 6.5 4.12 2.42
Lower bounds 2.42 [14] 2.42 [14] 4 [23] 2
All bounds in the table are for the worst-case scenarios when the number of bidders n can be
arbitrarily large. Better bounds are know for every fixed number of bidders, although, as n grows,
these bounds quickly converge to the worst-case bounds given in the table.
An important new perspective of [7] was to view benchmark function as a variable parameter
of the model. It should be noted that to a limited degree an earlier work [21] also studied a broad
class of benchmarks in the digital goods setting. In this paper, we continue to explore this idea in
more general settings. Unlike [7] we explicitly design auctions with improved competitive ratios.
The following general yet simple observation appears to be very helpful in our analysis. When
we seek for an auction with good performance against a specific benchmark f(b), it is often the
case that f(b) can be decomposed into the sum of two functions f(b) = f1(b)+ f2(b), such that it
is easier to find good competitive auctions separately against f1(·) and f2(·). The following lemma
gives an upper bound on the competitive ratio against the original benchmark function f(·).
Lemma 1.1 (Decomposition lemma). Let A1 and A2 be truthful λ1 and λ2 competitive auctions
against the benchmarks f1(·) and f2(·), respectively. Then there is a truthful λ1 + λ2 competitive
auction against the benchmark f1(·) + f2(·).
Proof. We construct an auction that runs A1 with probability
λ1
λ1+λ2
and runs A2 with probability
λ2
λ1+λ2
. The constructed auction is (universally) truthful by definition. Its performance for any bid
vector b is at least
λ1
λ1 + λ2
A1(b) +
λ2
λ1 + λ2
A2(b) ≥
λ1
λ1 + λ2
f1(b)
λ1
+
λ2
λ1 + λ2
f2(b)
λ2
=
f1(b) + f2(b)
λ1 + λ2
.
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1.3 Related Work
The worst-case study of digital goods auctions was initiated by Goldberg et al. [16]. The competitive
prior-free framework was formulated by Fiat et al. [12]. Over the past decade a lot of effort
has been devoted to improving the analysis and competitive ratios of digital goods auctions, see,
e.g., [13], [14], [21], [11], [1] and [22]. In our recent work [7], we showed the optimal bound on the
competitive ratio for digital goods auctions.
A few other closely related settings have stemmed from the study of digital goods auctions with
the most immediate extension being the limited supply auctions also known as multi-unit auctions.
Multi-unit environments have been traditionally studied with respect to the F (2,ℓ) benchmark,
which allows a straightforward reduction [15] to the unlimited supply case with a specific number
of bidders. Thus optimal bounds of [7] carry over to the multi-unit auctions with respect to the
F (2,ℓ) benchmark.
The general downward-closed single-parameter environments include, e.g,. matching, matroid,
and position auctions have also received considerable attention in recent years. Hartline and
Yan [20] characterized the optimal revenue in the envy-free outcomes and proposed EFO(2) as
a uniform benchmark for all of these environments. They presented a truthful multi-unit auction
with a constant competitive ratio and established a no-loss reduction from position and matroid
auctions to a simpler multi-unit setting. Devanur et al. [10] improved the competitive ratio to 9.6
and gave a 189-competitive auction for the more general downward-closed environments. Ha and
Hartline [19] further improved the competitive ratio to 30.4 for the downward-closed environments.
In an unpublished followup paper [18], the authors presented a 11-competitive auction using ele-
gant combination of biased sampling and profit extraction ideas. The best known ratio is due to
Devanur at al. [9] (official version of [18]) with a 7.5-competitive auction that builds upon the
biased sampling approach in a significantly more intricate manner than in [18] .
As a multi-parameter extension of the digital goods auctions setting, Gravin and Lu [17] studied
competitive auction in the presence of positive externalities among the buyers.
Another thread of work considers digital goods auctions is in the online framework. Motivated
by internet advertising, Mahdian and Saberi [24] proposed a model where supply is unknown in
advance. Devanur and Hartline [8] studied prior-free auctions in this model and by applying random
sampling technique derived results in the prior-free setting. There was substantial interest from
machine learning community [5], [6], [3] in a closely related online pricing problem. However, this
work together with an earlier work [4] on online auctions does not assume random order of arrivals.
It also uses machine learning techniques resulting in a worse performance guarantees that depends
on h, the ratio between the highest and the lowest bid. Lastly, the setting of Koutsoupias and
Pierrakos [23] is closely related to generalized secretary problem (for a survey on secretary problem
and online digital goods auction see [2]). They gave a black-box reduction of the online problem
to the standard off-line digital goods setting with a factor 2 loss in the competitive ratio.
2 Limited supply
It was pointed out in [15] that there is an equivalence between the unlimited supply auction problem
for the F (2) benchmark and the limited supply auction problem for the F (2,ℓ) benchmark. Namely,
any unlimited supply auction with ℓ bidders that is β-competitive against F (2) can be converted
into a β-competitive ℓ-unit auction against F (2,ℓ). This equivalence and the tight results of [7]
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for unlimited supply auctions with ℓ bidders against F (2) benchmark yield tight results for ℓ-unit
auction against F (2,ℓ) benchmark with the same competitive ratio λℓ.
1
A similar equivalence was established in [7] between ℓ-unit auctions competing with any bench-
mark f(·) that depends only on the first ℓ highest bids and unlimited supply auctions with ℓ bidders.
However, beyond such benchmarks [7] does not provide a satisfactory way to compute tight com-
petitive ratios in the limited supply case. For example, economically meaningful benchmark EFO(2)
of Hartline and Yan [20] depends not only on the first ℓ highest bids.
Definition 2.1. For a fixed valuation profile v, order all valuations by v(1) ≥ v(2) ≥ · · · ≥ v(n) and
let g(j) = j · v(j) for each 2 ≤ j ≤ n. Consider the concave envelope ĝ(·) of the function g(·) on the
interval [2, n]. Formally, for each 2 ≤ j ≤ n
ĝ(j) = max
i,k:
2≤i≤j≤k≤n
[
g(i) ·
k − j
k − i
+ g(k) ·
j − i
k − i
]
.
For ℓ-unit auction EFO(2)(v) = max
2≤i≤ℓ
ĝ(i).
There is only a constant gap between EFO(2) and F (2,ℓ) benchmarks for ℓ-unit auctions.
Lemma 2.1. For any valuation profile v,
F (2,ℓ)(v) ≤ EFO(2)(v) ≤ F (2,ℓ)(v) + (ℓ− 2) · v(ℓ+1).
Proof. The first inequality holds because
F (2,ℓ)(v) = max
2≤i≤ℓ
g(i) ≤ max
2≤i≤ℓ
ĝ(i) = EFO(2)(v).
We next prove the second inequality. Let the maximum in the definition of EFO(2)(v) =
max
2≤j≤ℓ
ĝ(j) be attained at j∗, i.e., EFO(2)(v) = ĝ(j∗). Let 2 ≤ i∗ ≤ j∗ ≤ k∗ ≤ n be such that
ĝ(j∗) = g(i∗) ·
k∗ − j∗
k∗ − i∗
+ g(k∗) ·
j∗ − i∗
k∗ − i∗
.
We observe that F (2,ℓ)(v) ≥ i∗ · v(i∗) = g(i
∗), since 2 ≤ i∗ ≤ j∗ ≤ ℓ.
If k∗ ≤ ℓ, then F (2,ℓ)(v) ≥ g(k∗). Moreover, F (2,ℓ)(v) is greater than any convex combination
of g(i∗) and g(k∗) and we get F (2,ℓ)(v) ≥ EFO(2)(v) as desired. On the other hand, if k∗ ≥ ℓ+ 1,
we have
EFO(2)(v) = g(i∗) ·
k∗ − j∗
k∗ − i∗
+ g(k∗) ·
j∗ − i∗
k∗ − i∗
= g(i∗) ·
k∗ − j∗
k∗ − i∗
+ k∗ · v(k∗) ·
j∗ − i∗
k∗ − i∗
= g(i∗)− g(i∗) ·
j∗ − i∗
k∗ − i∗
+ (j∗ − i∗) · v(k∗) ·
i∗
k∗ − i∗
+ (j∗ − i∗) · v(k∗)
= g(i∗)− v(i∗) ·
i∗(j∗ − i∗)
k∗ − i∗
+ v(k∗) ·
i∗(j∗ − i∗)
k∗ − i∗
+ (j∗ − i∗) · v(k∗)
≤ g(i∗) + (j∗ − i∗) · v(k∗)
≤ F (2,ℓ)(v) + (ℓ− 2) · v(ℓ+1).
1λℓ = 1−
ℓ∑
i=2
i
i−1
(
ℓ−1
i−1
) (
−1
ℓ
)i−1
, which converges to 2.42 when ℓ approaches infinity.
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The last inequality holds, because g(i∗) ≤ F (2,ℓ)(v), j∗ − i∗ ≤ ℓ− 2, and v(k∗) ≤ v(ℓ+1).
One can further estimate F (2,ℓ)(v) ≥ (ℓ − 1) · v(ℓ) ≥ (ℓ − 2) · v(ℓ+1); this implies a trivial
upper bound of 2F (2,ℓ)(v) on EFO(2)(v). As λℓ is the exact competitive ratio against the F
(2,ℓ)
benchmark, the competitive ratio against EFO(2)(v) lies between λℓ and 2λℓ. These two bounds
were the best currently known [10]. However, these bounds are not tight. In particular, we can
improve on the upper bound.
We decompose the upper bound of Lemma 2.1 on EFO(2) into the sum of two benchmarks
f1(v) = F
(2,ℓ)(v) and f2(v) = (ℓ− 2) · v(ℓ+1). The competitive ratio against the first benchmark is
λℓ. On the other hand, the revenue of VCG mechanism selling ℓ items is ℓ ·v(ℓ+1), which shows that
the competitive ratio against f2(v) is
ℓ−2
ℓ
. By combining Lemma 1.1 and Lemma 2.1 we obtain
the following claim, which improves the upper bound on the competitive ratio against EFO(2) to
λℓ + 1.
Theorem 2.2. For multi-unit auctions with ℓ units for sale, there is a (λℓ+
ℓ−2
ℓ
)-competitive auction
against the EFO(2) benchmark, where λℓ is the optimal competitive ratio of unlimited supply auction
with ℓ bidders against the F (2) benchmark.
On the other hand, it can be seen that the lower bound of λℓ is not tight. In particular, for
any truthful auction A, we can write the following lower bound by employing the equal revenue
distribution Dn.2
E
v∼Dn
[EFO(2)(v)]
E
v∼Dn
[A(v)]
>
E
v∼Dn
[F (2,ℓ)(v)]
E
v∼Dn
[A(v)]
=
n · λℓ
n
= λℓ,
where we plugged in the first equality the expected value of F (2,ℓ) over equal revenue distribution
E[F (2,ℓ)(v)] = n · λℓ. One can compute this expectation using certain properties of equal revenue
distribution:
E
[
F (2,ℓ)(v)
]
= E
v∼Dn
[
v(ℓ+1)
]
· E
v˜∼Dℓ
[
F (2)(v˜)
]
= E
[
v(ℓ+1)
]
· ℓ · λℓ.
This lower bound for each ℓ is strictly greater than λℓ. Although, since EFO
(2)(v) ≤ F (2)(v), this
approach cannot give us a bound better than λn. This naturally makes us conjecture that the
competitive ratio against the benchmark EFO(2)(v) for any supply ℓ never exceeds competitive
ratio λ = limn→∞ λn of the optimal unlimited supply auction.
3 Downward-Closed environments
In this section, we consider general downward-closed permutation environments. We denote by
EFO(v) the optimal revenue achievable in an envy-free allocation for the vector of values v. Our
benchmark of interest is EFO(2)(v) = EFO(v2, v2, . . . , vn). The basic ingredients of our auction
are biased random sampling and the profit extraction auction from [18]. Our auction is slightly
different from the one presented in [18] and has a better competitive ratio of 6.51 compared to 11
2In the equal revenue distribution, all values vi are drawn identically and independently with probability Pr[vi >
x] = 1
x
for any x ≥ 1. A remarkable property of this distribution is that any truthful auction has the same expected
revenue n.
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of [18]. It is much simpler than another auction with competitive ratio 7.5 presented in [9], which
has a few more components on the top of random sampling and profit extraction.
The profit extraction (PER) auction receives as a parameter a target valuation profile v˜. When
PERv˜(v) is run on the actual valuation profile v, it is able to extract revenue greater than or equal
to the value of the envy-free benchmark EFO(v˜) as well as EFO(2)(v˜), if profile v dominates v˜
(v  v˜), i.e., v(i) ≥ v˜(i) for every bidder i. If v 6 v˜, PER rejects all bidders.
Lemma 3.1 (Ha and Hartline, 2012). For any downward-closed permutation environment, there
is a truthful profit extraction auction PERv˜(v) with a profit of at least EFO(2)(v˜), if v(i) ≥ v˜(i) for
each bidder i.
Our auction is quite simple: with some probability p we run the single-item Vickrey auction;
with probability 1 − p we run the following σ-biased random-sampling profit-extraction auction
(denoted by σ-BSPE).
• Divide all bidders into two groups market M and sample S: Place the two highest bids in M .
Sample the rest bids independently with probability σ < 1/2 in S and with probability 1− σ
in M .
• Let v˜ = vS . Allocate to the winners of PER
v˜(v
M
).
Theorem 3.2. For any downward-closed permutation environment, σ-BSPE is a 6.51-competitive
truthful auction against the envy-free benchmark EFO(2)(v).
Proof. For any random coin flips of σ-BSPE, the allocation rule of PERv˜ is monotone. This
implies that σ-BSPE also has a monotone allocation rule. Therefore, since our environment is a
single-parameter domain, σ-BSPE allocation with the threshold payment rule makes the auction
universally truthful.
We next estimate the expected revenue of σ-BSPE. We follow closely the proof strategy de-
scribed in [18], the main difference being in the way we deal with the benchmark EFO(2)(v). We
note that if vM  vS , then the total sum of the threshold payments of PER
v˜(vM ) is at least
EFO(vS); we further observe that the threshold payments of σ-BSPE can be only larger than that,
as we could only increase payments of the two highest bidders.
Claim 3.3. The probability that vM  vS is at least 1− (
σ
1−σ )
3.
Proof. Sort all bidders in the original profile v : v(1) ≥ · · · ≥ v(n) (without loss of generality we
assume that all inequalities are strict). We simulate our random sampling process by independently
flipping a biased coin for each bidder (i) in this order. Each time we count the difference between
the number of bidders in M and S. Note that because we always place the highest two bids in M ,
after the first two steps the difference becomes two. Note that vM 6 vS if and only if at some
step (i) this difference becomes negative. We next estimate the probability that this event never
happens.
We consider an infinite random walk on a one-dimensional infinite line; each time we move
to the left with probability σ and to the right with probability 1 − σ. It is well known that the
probability that such a random walk starting at a point x eventually makes one step to the left
from x is σ1−σ . As our random walk starts at point 2, it would take three such steps to move below
0. The probability of this event is ( σ1−σ )
3. Therefore, the probability that this never happens after
n steps is at least 1− ( σ1−σ )
3.
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We conclude that the expected revenue of the σ-BSPE is at least
E [σ-BSPE] ≥ E [EFO(vS) | vM  vS ] ·Pr [vM  vS ]
= E [EFO(vS)]−E [EFO(vS) | vM 6 vS ] ·Pr [vM 6 vS ]
≥ σ · EFO(v−{1,2})− EFO(v−{1,2}) ·Pr [vM 6 vS ]
≥
(
σ −
( σ
1− σ
)3)
EFO(v−{1,2}),
where v−{1,2} is the bid vector without first two highest bids. The maximum of the function
(σ − ( σ1−σ )
3) is attained at σ ≈ 0.29 with a rough value of 0.22. Thus, the competitive ratio of
σ-BSPE against the benchmark EFO(v−{1,2}) is 4.51.
On the other hand, by running the single-item Vickrey auction, we extract revenue of at least
1
2 · EFO((v2, v2)). Note that by subadditivity of EFO (shown in [20]) we have EFO((v2, v2)) +
EFO(v−{1,2}) ≥ EFO((v2, v2,v−{1,2})) = EFO
(2)(v). Therefore, according to Lemma 1.1 one can
achieve the competitive ratio of 4.51+2 = 6.51 against the benchmark EFO((v2, v2))+EFO(v−{1,2}).
Thus, we obtain a 6.51-competitive auction against EFO(2)(v), which runs 0.22-BSPE with prob-
ability 4.51/6.51 and the single-item Vickrey auction with probability 2/6.51.
4 Online Auctions
Let {Mnoff}
∞
n=2 be a sequence of β-competitive offline digital goods auctions against a benchmark
f(·) for each number of bidders n. To simplify notation, we refer {Mnoff}
∞
n=2 as Moff auction
omitting the number of bidders when it could be inferred from the context.
Theorem 4.1 (Koutsoupias, Pierrakos [23]). Let Moff be a β-competitive offline auctions against
the F (2) benchmark. The online sampling auction is a 2β-competitive against the F (2) benchmark
with bidders arriving in a random order.
The online sampling auction by [23] uses a black box reduction from an offline digital-goods
auction Moff to construct an online competitive auction Mon. Their auction, upon the arrival of
each bidder k, observes first k − 1 bids b[k−1] , (b1, . . . , bk−1) and runs M
k
off(b
[k−1]) for bidder k.
In particular, [23] used the offline auction of [21] with a competitive ratio of 3.24, they obtained
an upper bound of 6.48. In a recent paper [7], it was shown that the optimal competitive ratio of
Moff is in fact 2.42, which gives an upper bound of 4.84 for the online problem. There is also a
lower bound of 4 in [23] for online auctions with only 2 bidders.
Corollary 4.2. The optimal competitive ratio of online auctions is between 4 and 4.84.
We next propose another simple black-box reduction from offline to online auctions with a better
competitive guarantee. Any online auction can be thought of as a sequence of offline auctions run
for a set of bidders already present at each time. The main idea of our design is to tailor each of our
offline auctions to a different from F (2) benchmark so that their combination has good performance
with respect to F (2).
Theorem 4.3. Let f(b) = max(4b2, 3b3, 4b4, . . . , kbk) and Moff be a β-competitive auction against
the f(·) benchmark. Then there is a β-competitive online auction against F (2), where bidders arrive
in a random order.
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Proof. Any truthful online auctionMon can be viewed as a weighted combination of offline auctions
{An}∞n=2 running on n = 1, 2 . . . bidders
Mon(b) =
∑
n=1
1
n
·An(b[n]).
Indeed, each time whenMon observes first n− 1 bids b
[n−1] and offers a price to bidder n, it could
have seen any combination of n−1 bids among b[n] equally likely, since bidders arrive uniformly at
random. Therefore, Mon derives
1
n
of the revenue of offline auction An(b[n]). We denote by Mkon
the online auction run only up to k rounds, i.e.,
Mkon(b) =
k∑
n=1
1
n
·An(b[n]).
We are going to construct our online auction Mon inductively at each time increasing the
number of bidders by one. Namely, we assume that for all n = k − 1 bidders our Mon auction is
β-competitive. Next we specify an offline auction Ak which together with Mk−1on is β-competitive
for k bidders.
For n = 1 bidder F (2) is 0, so Mon is competitive regardless of A
1. By induction hypothesis,
we know that for any fixed bid vector b[k−1],
β · Mk−1on (b
[k−1]) ≥ F (2)(b[k−1]).
Since the first k − 1 bids are uniformly selected from b[k], we have
β ·Mk−1on (b
[k]) =
1
k
k∑
i=1
β · Mk−1on (b
[k]
-i ) ≥
1
k
k∑
i=1
F (2)(b
[k]
-i ).
Let us sort the bids in b[k] by b1 ≥ b2 ≥ · · · ≥ bk. We compare the revenue of M
k−1
on with
each bℓ, for 2 ≤ ℓ ≤ k. We have F
(2)(b
[k]
-i ) ≥ ℓ · bℓ for every i > ℓ. If ℓ > 2 and i ≤ ℓ, then
F (2)(b
[k]
-i ) ≥ (ℓ−1) · bℓ. Unfortunately, for ℓ = 2, we cannot write F
(2)(b
[k]
-1 ) ≥ b2 or F
(2)(b
[k]
-2 ) ≥ b2.
Therefore,
1
k
k∑
i=1
F (2)(b
[k]
-i ) ≥ max
(
2k − 4
k
b2,
3k − 3
k
b3, . . . ,
ℓ(k − ℓ) + (ℓ− 1)ℓ
k
bℓ, . . . ,
k2 − k
k
bk
)
≥ F (2)(b[k])−
1
k
max(4b2, 3b3, 4b4, . . . , kbk).
We want the offline auction Ak to have good performance against f(b) = max(4b2, 3b3, 4b4, . . . , kbk).
We know that there is a β-competitive auction Moff with respect to this benchmark f(·). Thus,
there is a β-competitive auction for k bidders in the online setting. This completes the proof.
Note that f(b) ≤ F (2)(b)+ 2b2. According to Lemma 1.1, we can run a mixture of the optimal
auction against F (2) and single-item Vickery auction against 2b2 to achieve a (λ + 2)-competitive
auction with respect to f(·), which is already an improvement over the result of [23]. However, we
can actually derive the optimal ratio using the same approach as that for F (2), which yields an
even better competitive ratio for the online auction problem.
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Theorem 4.4. The optimal competitive ratio of (offline) digital good auction with respect to the
benchmark f(b) = max(4b2, 3b3, 4b4, . . . , nbn) is at most 4.12.
3
As f(b) = 4b2 for n = 2, 3, and 4 bidders we get competitive ratio of 4, which exactly matches
the lower bound. Therefore, our online auction is optimal for the case of 2, 3, and 4 bidders.
4.1 The benchmark maxV
The results of [23] carry over for another standard benchmark, namely, the maximum Vickery
maxV. As the exact competitive ratio of the optimal offline auction against maxV was shown
in [7] to be e − 1 and since 2maxV(v) = F (2,ℓ)(v) for n = 2 bidders, the approach of [23] implies
the following claim.
Theorem 4.5 (Koutsoupias et al. [23]). The competitive ratio of the online sampling auction
of [23] is at most 2(e − 1) against the maxV benchmark. The competitive ratio of any online
auction against maxV is at least 2.
Interestingly, if we run Mon exactly as proposed in [23], i.e., as a sequence of Moff tailored to
F (2), then Mon appears to be specifically well suited for the maxV benchmark. This observation
once again highlights how useful is the idea of thinking about the problem with respect to different
benchmarks.
Theorem 4.6. Let Moff be a β-competitive auction against the F
(2) benchmark. The online sam-
pling auctions composed of a sequence of offline auctionsMoff against F
(2) is β-competitive against
maxV.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 4.3, we proceed by induction on the number of bidders. We
have
β ·Mk−1on (b
[k]) ≥
1
k
k∑
i=1
maxV(b
[k]
-i ).
We sort the bids in b[k] : b1 ≥ · · · ≥ bk. For a fixed ℓ, we want to estimate how the revenue of
Mk−1on is compared to bℓ. For each i > ℓ we have F
(2)(b
[k]
-i ) ≥ (ℓ − 1) · bℓ; and for i ≤ ℓ, we have
F (2)(b
[k]
-i ) ≥ (ℓ− 2) · bℓ. Hence,
1
k
k∑
i=1
F (2)(b
[k]
-i ) ≥ max
(
k − 2
k
b2, . . . ,
(ℓ− 1)(k − ℓ) + (ℓ− 2)ℓ
k
bℓ, . . . ,
(k − 2)k
k
bk
)
= max
(
k − 2
k
b2, . . . ,
(ℓ− 1)k − ℓ
k
bℓ, . . . ,
(k − 1)k − k
k
bk
)
≥ maxV(b)−
1
k
F (2)(b).
Thus, the online sampling auction by running a β-competitive auction against F (2) benchmark is
β-competitive against maxV.
Corollary 4.7. The competitive ratio of online auctions against maxV is between 2 and 2.42.
3the actual ratio for a fixed n is 1−
n∑
i=2
(
−1
n
)i−1 i
i−1
(
n−1
i−1
)
+ 3n
2(n−2)
((
1− 2
n
)n−1
+ 1− 2
n
)
.
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A Proof of Theorem 4.4
Proof. By the same argument as in [7] for F (2), the matching lower bound for the optimal competi-
tive ratio is achieved by the equal revenue distribution with the support Rn≥1. For n ≤ 4, f(b) = 4b2.
In the following, we always assume n > 4. We first observe that f(b) = max(4b2,EFO
(2)(b)).
We recall that equal revenue distribution Dn over the bid vectors is i.i.d. with the density
function w(b) = 1
b2
and cumulative density 1 − 1
b
supported on [1,∞). Let B be a random vector
drawn fromDn. The key technical problem for us is to compute the expected value of the benchmark
f(B). Following [14], we compute the probability Pr[f(B) ≥ z] for any given z. Since f(B) is at
least n, we may only consider z ≥ n. Let a random variable Vi be the i-th largest bid in B. We
also define a set of random variables
Fn,k = max
i=1,2,...,n
(k + i) · Vi.
Let Hi denote the event
Vi ≥
z
k + i
and
∧
j=i+1,i+2,...,n
Vj <
z
k + j
.
The probability of Hi can be written as
Pr [Hi] =
(
n
i
)(
k + i
z
)i
Pr [Fn−i,k+i < z] .
Since Hi’s are mutually exclusive and the event Fn,k ≥ z is the union of Hi for i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
we get
Pr [Fn,k ≥ z] =
∑
i
Pr [Hi] =
∑
i
(
n
i
)(
k + i
z
)i
Pr [Fn−i,k+i < z] . (1)
This gives a recursive relation for Pr[Fn,k ≥ z] and the boundary condition is Pr[F0,k ≥ z] = 0.
This recursion has been solved in [14]:
Pr [Fn,k ≥ z] = 1−
(
z − k
z
)n (z − k − n
z − k
)
.
Let H′2 denote the event V2 ≥
z
4 and
∧
j=3,4,...,n Vj <
z
j
. Then
Pr
[
H′2
]
=
(
n
2
)(
4
z
)2
Pr [Fn−2,2 < z] .
This implies that
Pr [f(B) ≥ z]
= Pr
[
H′2
]
+
∑
j=3,4,...,n
Pr [Hj]
= Pr
[
H′2
]
+Pr [Fn,0 ≥ z]−Pr [H1]−Pr [H2]
=
(
n
2
)(
4
z
)2
Pr [Fn−2,2 < z] +
n
z
−
n
z
Pr [Fn−1,1 < z]−
(
n
2
)(
2
z
)2
Pr [Fn−2,2 < z]
=
n
z
−
n
z
(
z − 1
z
)n−1(z − n
z − 1
)
+
6n(n− 1)
z2
(
z − 2
z
)n−2(z − n
z − 2
)
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Therefore, we have
E [f(B)] =
∫ ∞
0
Pr [f(B) ≥ z] dz
= n+
∫ ∞
n
(
n
z
−
n
z
(
z − 1
z
)n−1(z − n
z − 1
)
+
6n(n− 1)
z2
(
z − 2
z
)n−2(z − n
z − 2
))
dz
= n− n
n∑
i=2
(
−1
n
)i−1 i
i− 1
(
n− 1
i− 1
)
+ 6n(n− 1)
∫ ∞
n
1
z2
(
z − 2
z
)n−2(z − n
z − 2
)
dz.
The integration part is∫ ∞
n
1
z2
(
z − 2
z
)n−2(z − n
z − 2
)
dz
=
∫ ∞
n
1
z2
(1−
n
z
)
(
z − 2
z
)n−3
dz
=
∫ ∞
n
1
z2
(1−
n
z
)
(
n−3∑
i=0
(
n− 3
i
)
(−2)i
zi
)
dz
=
n−3∑
i=0
(
n− 3
i
)
(−2)i
∫ ∞
n
(
1
zi+2
−
n
zi+3
)
dz
=
n−3∑
i=0
(
n− 3
i
)
(−2)i
(
1
(i+ 1)ni+1
−
1
(i+ 2)ni+1
)
=
n−3∑
i=0
(
n− 3
i
)
(−2)i
1
(i+ 1)(i + 2)ni+1
=
n
4(n − 1)(n − 2)
n−3∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i+ 2
)(
−2
n
)i+2
=
n
4(n − 1)(n − 2)
((
1−
2
n
)n−1
− 1−
(
n− 1
1
)
−2
n
)
=
n
4(n − 1)(n − 2)
((
1−
2
n
)n−1
+ 1−
2
n
)
Therefore, we have
E [f(B)] = n− n
n∑
i=2
(
−1
n
)i−1 i
i− 1
(
n− 1
i− 1
)
+
3n2
2(n− 2)
((
1−
2
n
)n−1
+ 1−
2
n
)
.
And the competitive ratio is
1−
n∑
i=2
(
−1
n
)i−1 i
i− 1
(
n− 1
i− 1
)
+
3n
2(n− 2)
((
1−
2
n
)n−1
+ 1−
2
n
)
.
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